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INTRODUCTION*
The state secrets privilege has received a tremendous amount of scholarly attention in the US in the last decade, initially prompted by the administration of President George W. Bush seeking early dismissals of lawsuits that dealt with allegations of serious constitutional and human rights violations. 1 The administration's litigation posture was troublingbut the judicial acceptance of these claims, largely based on the judiciary's own formalistic view of its own role in engaging the executive branch on national security secrecy 2 -allowed the executive branch to make virtually unilateral secrecy determinations that shielded it from civil suits.
In September 2009 the Obama administration created a new policy that mandated a more tigorous internal administrative review prior to invoking the state secrets privilege. 3 In the years since the new policy took effect, it appears as though this internal review process has resulted in little difference with regard to the invocation of the privilege at the * This chapter is drawn from a previous work: Sudha Setty, Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1629 (2012). 1 pleadings stage in cases that allege torture and other human rights abuses. 4 One high-profile case, that of Binyam Mohamed and other plaintiffs claiming that they had been subject to extraordinary rendition, torture, and prolonged detention, offers evidence of a disturbing trend of US courts retreating to formalistic reasoning 5 to extend unwarranted deference to the executive branch in security-related 6 contexts.? In this chapter, I consider the state secrets privilege and place the formalist decisionmaking of the Mohamed court in juxtaposition with other nations' jurisprudence -including the English courts that dealt with a separate I use judicial formalism to refer to a methodology that gives primacy to narrow rule-following rather than consideration of the role of the courts to act in a way that is infused with morality when necessary to preserve individual rights. See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 612-16 (1999) (describing one form of formalism as 'apurposive mle-following'). Justice Antonin Scalia has supported use of a formal approach to maximize stability and credibility in the Supreme Court's decision making, opining that a 'discretionconfening approach is ill suited ... to a legal system in which the supreme court can review only an insignificant propo1iion of the decided cases'. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1989).
6
Cass Sunstein has offered three categories of judicial decision-making in wartime: national security maximalism, in which courts defer broadly to executive branch claims of Article II authority; liberty maximalism, in which courts maintain a peacetime approach to constitutional liberty questions; and minimalism, in which courts use a narrow approach to creating precedent to weigh security and liberty interests. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50-52 (2004) . I suggest that Mohamed and similar decisions should be conceived of differently, reflecting a formal and narrow adherence to procedures and rules as a means of enabling deference to executive claims and avoiding meaningful engagement in underlying civil liberties concems. lawsuit brought by Mohamed there. This case exemplifies the US shift away from the flexible, rule of law-oriented approach that courts in the United Kingdom and Israel take, and toward the formalistic rigidity that the Indian Supreme Court often employs in government secrecy cases. 8 Given the Obama administration's aggressive invocation of the state secrets privilege and the judiciary's unwillingness to defend the ability of individuals to litigate their basic human and civil rights, I conclude that for meaningful change to occur, the United States Congress must re-introduce state secrets reform legislation that infuses the litigation process with procedural and substantive fairness, 9 and that courts must step away from judicial formalism and instead take on the complex and difficult task of providing a venue for government accountability.
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
In his prefatory language to the Obama administration's 2009 state secrets policy, Attorney General Eric Holder emphasizes that the policy's goals include 'provid[ing] greater accountability and reliability in the invocation of the state secrets privilege in litigation ... [and] strengthen-[ing] public confidence that the U.S. government will invoke the privilege in comt only when genuine and significant harm to national defense or foreign relations is at stake and only to the extent necessary to safeguard those interests' . 10 The policy also includes important limitations such as a prohibition against using the privilege to conceal violations of the law or prevent embanassment to the government. 11 Unfortunately, the promise 8 These four nations -the United States, England, Israel and India -are useful comparators because of their shared common law traditions and the shared roots of evidentiary privileges such as the state secrets privilege in English law and policy.
9 'Congress's reform attempts, albeit unsuccessful, have attempted to improve procedural and substantive justice for plaintiffs. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy on the State Secrets Protection Act). 10 Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.
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Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. The rest of the policy establishes the layers of review with the Department of Justice with regard to satisfying the procedural requirements for invoking and defending the privilege. These procedural requirements are first laid out in the seminal US state secrets case of United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-8, 10-11 (1953 In granting the govemment's motion to dismiss, the district court used the same reasoning that other US courts dealing with the privilege have relied upon, 16 primarily the need to dismiss the suit because the subject matter at issue-the govemment's extraordinary rendition program-was itself a state secret that could jeopardize national security interests if revealed. 17 A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, rejecting the government's claims that the suit needed to be dismissed outright based on its subject matter. 18 The administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit to hear the case en bane, where it prevailed in having Mohamed's suit dismissed. 
FORMALISM IN JEPPESEN
The Ninth Circuit en bane dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in a formalistic opinion that failed to acknowledge the reality of the gross human rights abuses that plaintiffs suffered. The majority began its evaluation of the government's invocation of the privilege by finding that the procedural requirements were met and that the information is privileged. 19 The court then reasoned that it is obligated to dismiss a suit if it appeared that privileged information would be necessary to litigate the case. 20 The majority found that even if plaintiffs were able to prove their case relying solely on publicly available evidence, dismissal of the suit was still warranted because Jeppesen Dataplan would have found it difficult to mount a defense without implicating privileged material.2 1 It is particularly ironic that the majority, while claiming to have struggled with the tension between human rights and security concerns, ultimately retreated to rigid and formalist reasoning that turned on its concern that a company allegedly complicit in the torture of innocent civilians is able to adequately defend itself in a civil matter. 22 The majority opinion abdicated its structural responsibility to uphold the rule of law and check govemment abuse, instead offering only hollow platitudes and unlikely avenues for redress: at one point the court conjectures that the executive branch may decide someday to compensate the victims of the extraordinary rendition program, akin to the compensation for the rendition and internment of individuals of Japanese descent during World War Il.2 3 At other points, the court bizanely shifted responsibility to Congress to provide redress to plaintiffs, noting that 19 Id. at 1080, 1085-6 (relying on the test articulated in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)). 20 Id. at 1083.
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Id. at 1089-90. 22 The veracity of the plaintiffs' claims about Jeppesen Dataplan's complicity in the torture is not factored into the majority opinion, a point raised by the dissent. See id. at 1095 n 5 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting that former Jeppesen employees understood that their extraordinary rendition flights resulted in the torture of detainees). 23 Id. at 1091. It is remarkable that the majority considered the reparations awarded to Japanese internees during World War II as a potentially appropl'iate model of compensation. Those reparations came decades after the harm to the internees, and only after a national soul-searching as to how such poor national security policy was validated by all branches of government and the public. Further, hearkening back to the internment evokes comparisons to the deferential fonnalism of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which most Congress has the power to investigate government abuses, could enact private bills to compensate the plaintiffs or take up state secrets reform. 24 The dissent by Judge Hawkins included a critique of the narrowness of the majority opinion, noting the veracity of Mohamed's claims of Jeppesen Dataplan's role in rendition and torture, and that the majority's failure to give weight to these claims undermines an appropriate analysis.25 Judge Hawkins observed that the majority 'disregard[ed] the concept of checks and balances' and abdicated its responsibility by suggesting that the executive or Congress should act to provide compensation, characterizing the majority's suggestion regarding reparations as 'elevat[ing] the impractical to the point of absurdity' and noting the need to preserve an avenue for the tortured plaintiffs to seek redress in the courts if possible. 26
FORMALISM IN THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
The Supreme Court established the standard for evaluating a claim of the state secrets privilege in thtb 1950s, drawing from English precedent during World War II. English public interest immunity, used akin to the state secrets privilege, evolved in a different direction than that of the U.S. since that time; this dynamic is illustrated clearly in the contemporaneous treatment of Binyam Mohamed's lawsuit in the English courts. To further contextualize the analysis of judicial formalism in the application of the privilege, I briefly consider how Israel and India deal with questions of state secrecy during litigation. 27
England
English courts generally afford high levels of deference to government officials claiming public interest immunity,2 8 although the 2009 and 2010 modern commentators view as a profound failure of the judiciaty to uphold the rule of law and curb abuses by the national security state.
24
Id. at 1091-92. 25 Id. at 1095-96. 26 Id. at 1101.
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India and Israel are useful comparators as functioning democracies with constitutionally mandated separation of powers and serious ongoing national security threats, and, like the US in the context of the state secrets privilege, derive some legal processes from the United Kingdom. 28 See Air Canada v. Sec'y of State for Trade [1983] 33 The Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division reconsidered in early 2009 whether the public interest immunity certificate issued by the Foreign Secretary was compelling. 34 The public interest immunity certificate asserted that the summary report must remain undisclosed because the US government had threatened to 're-evaluate its intelligence sharing relationship with the United Kingdom' and possibly withhold vital national security information from the United Kingdom should the summary be disclosed to Mohamed's attorneys. 35 The English court laid out the test for balancing the public interest in national security and the public interest in 'open justice, the rule of law the need for the public interest immunity to apply, the court should give absolute deference). and democratic accountability' . 36 The test involved balancing the public interest in disclosure of the information and the possibility of serious harm to a public interest such as national security if disclosure is made, and determining whether national security interests can be protected by means other than nondisclosure. 3 7 Considering factors in support of disclosing the information, the court noted the need to uphold the rule of law,3 8 comport with international and supranational standards,3 9 ensure that allegations of serious criminality are not inappropriately dismissed, 40 maintain accountability over the government, 41 and protect the public and media interest in disclosure of government activities. 42 The court also appeared surprised that the U.S. government was apparently intetfering in a matter of the rule of law and government accountability in another country. 43 Nonetheless, the court relied on its long-standing precedent of deference to the executive branch in matters of national security 44 and upheld the Foreign Secretary's issuance of the public interest immunity certificate. 45 However, in October 2009 the court reversed its previous decision to withhold the information regarding Mohamed's treatment. 46 44 See id. at [63] - [67] . However, the court noted that such deference needed to be limited to instances of genuine national security, and not cases in which 'it appears that while disclosure of the material may cause embarrassment or arouse criticism, it will not damage any security or intelligence interest'. Id reasoned that there was an extremely low likelihood that the Obama administration would actually withhold intelligence from the United Kingdom, 47 and noted that 'a vital public interest requires, for reasons of democratic accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, that a summary of the most important evidence relating to the involvement of the British security services in wrongdoing be placed in the public domain in the United Kingdom' .4 8
The October 2009 decision ultimately rejected formalistic reasoning in favor of maintaining the rule of law, open justice and the possibility of public accountability. In February 2010, the Court of Appeal upheld the divisional court's decision, noting the veracity of Mohamed's claims of torture. 49 Specifically, the appellate decision looked to dicta in the US habeas corpus matter of Mohammed v. Obama. 50 In that case, Judge Kessler weighed the habeas corpus petition of detainee Farhi Saeed bin Mohammed and considered evidence proffered by the government that Binyam Mohamed, while in detention at Guantanamo Bay, told the government that bin Mohammed had trained with him at an al-Qaeda base.
51 Judge Kessler described the harrowing detention and torture of Binyam Mohamed while in US custody that rendered his testimony regarding bin Mohammed unreliable and inadmissible. 52 She further noted that '[t]he Government does not challenge or deny the accuracy of Binyam Mohamed's story of brutal treatment' . 53 The English Court of Appeal used this revelation as one basis for upholding the order for the UK government to disclose information 47 
Israel
Israeli courts, like their English counterparts, offer an example of how the courts balance imperatives of security with the rule of law when they refuse to accept a narrow interpretation of their own role. Courts, akin to the English reasoning in the Mohamed case, use a flexible, realist approach to analyzing these questions, giving significant weight to plaintiffs' allegations of human rights violations. In Israel almost any complaint against the executive branch is considered justiciable. 56 Although justiciability is no guarantee of ultimate success in litigation against the government, the institutionalization of hearing such cases reflects, at its best, a judicial willingness of the courts to engage in critical thinking about government claims regarding nfttional security.
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 57 plaintiffs challenged the preventative strikes undertaken by the Israeli military in response to alleged terrorist attacks based on the ensuing loss of civilian life and Israel's intemational law obligations. As an initial matter, the court considered a challenge by the government that the suit was not justiciable based on national security concerns. 58 The Israeli Supreme Court applied a four-pronged test to determine justiciability, reasoning that a case involving the impingement of human rights is always justiciable; 59 that a case in which the central issue is one of political or military policy and not a legal dispute is not justiciable; 60 that an issue that has already been decided by international courts and tribunals to which Israel is a signatory must be justiciable in Israel's domestic courts; and that judicial review is most appropriate in an ex post situation.
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In this case, the Israeli Supreme Court found that the claims were clearly justiciable. 62 Ultimately, the Israeli Supreme Court concluded that the targeted killings at issue were not per se illegal, but that they must be evaluated on an individual basis. 63 Although the holding in Public Committee Against Torture raises important and conceming questions as to the substantive justice of these decisions, a baseline structural benefit exists in having access to courts for grievances involving allegations of human rights violations.
India
Whereas England and Israel illustrate the ability of courts to utilize a rule of law analysis, India represents a hard line of formalism that the US is at risk of veering toward. Indian courts have historically granted the utmost deference to the executive branch as to when national security policy should be disclosed. 64 When cases raise issues of individual rights being compromised by government secrecy, courts purport to undertake a balancing test to determine whether the public interest or individual rights at stake should override executive secrecy; however, government claims regarding the necessity of secrecy consistently prevail. 65 Deference to executive branch decision-making is deep-rooted in national security-related cases, 66 and is consistent with India's history of granting the executive branch sole power to determine whether to disclose information in any number of contexts, including enforcement of its Official Secrets Act, a legacy of British colonial rule in India. 67 In Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, 68 the Indian Supreme Court considered whether to order the publication of background documents underlying a commissioned report on government corruption over which the government had claimed secrecy. Members of Parliament, including petitioner Dinesh Trivedi, alleged that the Home Minister refused disclosure to avoid government embarrassment. 69 The Indian Supreme Court began with the need for transparency, noting that 'Sunlight is the best . Therefore, disclosure of information in regard to the functioning of Gove1nment must be the rnle and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so demands.').
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India operfltes under the edicts of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 (OSA), enforced in India by the British colonial government. Under the OSA, any disclosure of information -intentional or inadvertent -likely to affect the sovereignty, integrity or security of India is punishable by imprisonment for up to fourteen years. disinfectant. But it is equally important to be alive to the dangers that lie ahead.' 70 The Indian Supreme Court accepted with little question the government's claim and hypothesized that the public furor toward individuals named in the report -should it be published in full -could lead to harassment and violence. Based on its own speculative concerns that appear grounded in historical deference to executive decisionmaking,71 the court upheld government secrecy claims. 72 Similar reasoning has been used in other secrecy matters,7 3 bolstered by claims of consistency with English public interest immunity jurisp1'udence.7 4 The level of deference offered by the Indian Supreme Court is higher than that of any of the other nations considered here, but is seemingly more consistent with the recent state secrets cases in the US than that of the English courts in the Mohamed litigation.7 5 The Indian Supreme Court, consistent with its security-related jurisprudence, has consistently reverted to a formalistic analysis that offers a rhetorical nod to the rule of 70 Id. § 19. 71 See SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA'S SUPREME COURT, ANTI-TERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 61-71, 90-91 (2009) (arguing that whereas social rights is considered an area in which the judiciary is expected to take an active role, security and secrecy are areas in which the constitutional framers and Parliament have purposefully curtailed the judiciary's ability to curb executive power), law and individual rights, but no avenue of relief for those who seek to chip away at government secrecy.7 6 CONCLUSION In the US, the state secrets cases illustrate what may be becoming the new normal in security-related jurisprudence: formalistic reasoning that allows the court to bow out of its counter-majoritarian role of protecting individual rights and justice. Certainly the approach taken by India and the US is not the only viable one -England and Israel are evidence of that. The Mohamed case illustrates that England's current application of the state secrets privilege -however historically deferential -reflects at least in some cases the prioritization of various rule of law principles by the English courts, including the need for open justice, government accountability, and the opportunity for redress by individual litigants. The flexible approach used by the English court to determine that secrecy ought not prevail in the Mohamed case is reassuring to those concemed with rights protection. Yet the larger specter of the US exerting pressure regarding the state secrets privilege serves as a waming that even though the US was not successful with regard to applying pressure on England,7 7 US soft power may successfully pressure courts in nations where courts would otherwise apply a narrower privilege.
Such a dynamic makes it all the more important that structural reform occur. Passage of strong state secrets reform legislation should become a 76 See Satish and Chandra, supra note 64, at 63 (critiquing the Indian Supreme Court's terrorism jurispmdence for focusing on procedural and technical questions and abdicating its role as a prot~ctor of fundamental rights).
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The US government's displeasure at the English treatment of Binyam Mohamed's case motivated the British government to propose the stripping of judicial review over similar cases in which sensitive information may be disclosed. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER, 2011, Cm. 8194, § 2.91 (UK), available at www.statewatch.org/news/ 2011/oct/uk-justice-and-security-green-paper.pdf. The Green Paper notes that such measures are necessary because '[s]ince Binyam Mohamed, the Government and its foreign government patiners have less confidence than before that the courts will accept the view of Ministers on the harm to national security that would result from disclosure'. Id. § 1.43; cf. United Kingdom House of Lords, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty-Fourth Report, Justice and Security Green Paper, at § § 99-103 (Mar. 27, 2012) (emphasizing the importance of courts in weighing government claims of the need for secrecy).
priority, 78 and courts should resist being cowed by assertions that judicial involvement in security matters is unwarranted or undermines the safety of the nation. 79 Although genuine access to the courts is no guarantee of substantive justice, substantive justice is unlikely to be achieved if the judiciary continues to retreat behind a wall of formalism.
